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Doing Student Projects in Conceptual and Historical Issues (CHIP): the 
potential of discourse analysis 
 
Peter Lamont, University of Edinburgh 
 
 
One of the problems of teaching CHIP is how to supervise projects in the area. 
Since Psychology students cannot be expected to have backgrounds in either 
history or philosophy, and since psychological projects are generally expected to 
be empirical, how can students carry out a meaningful project in this area? This 
article offers one solution to the problem, by showing how Discourse Analysis 
(DA) can be used as a method not only to analyze historical texts (cf. Lamont, 
2007), but also to explore conceptual issues in an empirical manner.  
 
 
Formulating a research question 
 
The first step is to find an appropriate research question. This is simply a matter 
of taking a significant historical or conceptual issue within Psychology, and then 
translating it into a question that can be answered by analyzing discourse. To 
take a basic example, perhaps the first conceptual issue that Psychology students 
encounter is the seemingly straightforward question: what is Psychology? This is 
typically asked at the beginning of an introductory textbook, and then promptly 
answered with a textbook definition. After that, students seem to spend little 
time considering the matter. However, there are all manner of conceptual issues 
that surround any definition of Psychology, whether concerning its self-defined 
scientific status or else its stated object of study, not to mention the implications 
of defining Psychology in a particular way. From a CHIP perspective, we might 
wish students to consider this question more carefully, and to problematize this 
textbook definition. 
 
This is something that can be done as a project, which explores the question 
from a different perspective, one that allows for empirical enquiry. Since this 
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question, ‘What is psychology?’ is one that Psychology textbooks answer, we can 
re-frame the question as one that might be answered by DA: ‘What is Psychology 
(according to Psychology textbooks)?’ or, more specifically, ‘How do Psychology 
textbooks define Psychology?’. Since the textbook definition is invariably the 
start of the first section of the Psychology textbook, which is usually entitled 
something like ‘What is Psychology?’ and which provides what amounts to an 
extended definition of the discipline, there is an obvious dataset available. 
Indeed, any conceptual issue that can be translated into a research question that 
is answerable by DA is a potential project, providing there is appropriate data 
available. 
 
 
Data collection 
 
My own preference is to use published texts as data. There are obvious 
differences between published texts and other kinds of data used for DA. Unlike 
research-generated data, such as interview data, published texts are produced by 
people in the real world, for reasons unconnected to the research. Published 
texts, then, are forms of naturally occurring discourse. They are not, of course, 
naturally occurring talk, since they are already published in written form. As a 
result, we are limited by the details of the text itself. For example, in terms of the 
analysis, we cannot examine turn-taking, since published texts are invariably 
monologues. Indeed, even published debates, such as Hansard, lack the 
necessary detail. On the other hand, there are clear advantages of working with 
such data. After all, they provide access to an astonishing variety of real world 
discourse, none of which needs to be transcribed. This means that relatively 
short term projects, as well as longer ones, are possible. Furthermore, we can 
examine the rhetorical features of any text. Even if there is no evidence of 
interaction within the text, there is always a potential audience for any text. That, 
after all, is why texts are written and published, as part of a wider ongoing social 
interaction. In terms of analysis, this context of publication may be relevant, and 
will be discussed below. 
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Meanwhile, in terms of data collection, appropriate discourse needs to be found. 
This is most easily done by identifying people, objects or events that are relevant 
to the research question, and relevant publications in which these are discussed. 
In the case of the example given above, data was collected from the opening 
sections of the many introductory Psychology textbooks that are currently 
available. Several of these were in the offices of course organizers, who regularly 
receive copies of new textbooks and new editions of existing ones, and changes 
in course textbooks over the years meant that there were others sitting 
unwanted on shelves. Additional material was available from online sample 
chapters and, for a small fee, from charity bookshops.  
 
 
Analysis 
 
There are, of course, several kinds of discourse analysis. The form I prefer is 
designed to be as straightforward as possible, and similar to early DA in 
Psychology (e.g. Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987) and more 
recent analyses of written texts (e.g. Macmillan & Edwards, 1999; Wallwork & 
Dixon, 2004). The procedures of DA are described in standard methodology 
textbooks (e.g. Willig, 2001, 87−104), and typically involve several close readings 
of the texts in the light of a specific research question, coding of relevant themes, 
and analysis of rhetorical function. For an example of this kind of analysis, see 
Lamont (2007), which was written primarily as an example of how DA could be 
used to analyze historical texts. Since then, Bunn (2012) has also provided a 
guide to using Foucauldian DA for a similar purpose. 
 
In the case of the above example, the reading, coding and analysis focused on 
how Psychology textbooks define the discipline. For the purposes of preliminary 
analysis, the research question was translated into more specific questions to 
help direct the analysis of the data, such as: how are objects (e.g. Psychology, 
other) and subjects (e.g. Psychologists, others) described?; what distinguishes 
Psychology/Psychologists from other objects/subjects?; what is Psychology like, 
and not like?; how are these comparisons made? The preliminary analysis sought 
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to identify common themes across the dataset. One of these, which we shall 
consider in a moment, was the frequent distinction between Psychology and 
commonsense. For example, one textbook included the following statements: 
 
Sometimes, the results of scientific studies are denounced as ‘common sense’ 
(Martin, Carlson & Buskist, 2009, 4) 
 
[P]sychological research frequently contradicts common-sense views (Martin et 
al, 2009, 5) 
 
The next step of the analysis considered the function of such descriptions. For 
example, distinctions between Psychology and commonsense were invariably a 
means of constructing psychological knowledge as not only different from, but 
also superior to, lay understandings of psychological matters. Here is an example 
of a relevant extract, which contains the descriptions above: 
 
Sometimes, the results of scientific studies are denounced as ‘common sense’: 
that they are so obvious as to be not worth the bother of setting up the 
experiment. The view, however, is generally ill-informed because, as you will 
discover throughout this book, psychological research frequently contradicts 
common-sense views.  (Martin et al, 2009, 4-5). 
 
In this extract, science is juxtaposed with ‘common sense’. Indeed, it is presented 
as not only different from, but also superior to, common sense (since the former 
can be ‘denounced’ as the latter). In distinguishing between the two kinds of 
knowledge, science is described as involving the ‘bother of setting up [an] 
experiment’, while common sense is equated with being ‘obvious’. This, of 
course, is a particular way of describing both science and common sense. In 
choosing these particular descriptions, scientific results are constructed as not 
obvious (this view is ‘generally ill-informed’). The inference here is that by 
taking the bother to set up an experiment, we can get past what seems obvious 
to more reliable knowledge. This claim is, in turn, supported by ‘psychological 
research’, which is also juxtaposed with common sense, as something that 
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‘frequently contradicts common sense views’. Thus, the distinction between 
psychological research and common sense allows psychology to be constructed, 
like ‘scientific studies’, as superior (non-obvious) knowledge.  
 
This, of course, is only one way of analyzing such data. There are different forms 
of discourse analysis, which approach texts in different ways. It may be worth 
briefly considering one significant difference between them – the problem of 
external context - since it has practical implications for how such analyses might 
proceed. Discursive psychologists who favour Conversation Analysis (CA) tend 
to regard it as inappropriate to consider information from the external context 
(i.e. outside of the data being analyzed) during the process of analysis. Since such 
analysis is focused on the concerns of the participants, not of the analyst, then 
unless participants can be seen to orient to a particular matter, it is seen as an 
imposition of the analyst’s agenda. Critical and Foucauldian Discourse Analysts, 
on the other hand, tend to view the external context as an essential feature of any 
analysis, since discourse is seen to reflect wider social processes, and so, in the 
process of analyzing the data, external matters may be considered that are not 
made explicit in the text (Wooffitt, 2005). This difference of approach is bound 
up with the aims and assumptions of these quite different methods, but it also 
points to a wider matter within psychological methods, that of subjectivity. In 
short, the former kind of analysis is more directly based on the data, while the 
latter approach allows for greater subjectivity. 
 
While my own view is that any method can be used to make a convincing 
argument, but that no method does this by itself, my preference has been to 
stress the empirical nature of DA: in short, that claims must be based on data 
that can be seen. All methods involve subjectivity, of course, but it is essential 
that students learn at what point, and in what ways, particular claims rest upon 
evidence. In this way, it can be made clear that qualitative research is not merely 
subjective, but rather that it is open about the nature of its subjectivity and, at 
the same time, about its empirical basis. How, then, does this relate to the 
problem of external context? 
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On the one hand, all texts are produced within a particular context, written by 
and for particular people at a particular time. The form of any text is naturally 
bound up with the wider aims and concerns of author and audience. In the case 
of Psychology textbooks, for example, these are very particular kinds of texts, not 
only the content but also the form of which reflect the relationship of Psychology 
to other sciences (e.g. Smyth, 2001). On the other hand, once we consider the 
wider context in which a text appears, there are endless ways in which we might 
interpret a particular extract. Thus (and this is merely my own view in relation 
to student projects), while consideration of the context is an appropriate topic 
for the introduction and discussion sections, the analysis itself should focus on 
answering the research question, based on what is on the page.  
 
For example, in the extract above, which is in the context of the beginning of an 
introductory textbook, the reader is addressed directly with a promise of later 
evidential support (‘as you will discover throughout this book’). This appeal to 
future evidence warrants the claim that psychological research contradicts 
commonsense, which directly answers the question about how psychology is 
defined. On the other hand, if we were to consider the text as a consumer 
product, rather than as an argument for the worth of psychology, then the 
presence of ‘as you will discover throughout this book’, appearing in the opening 
pages, might be seen as a sales pitch to the potential buyer. When the external 
context is considered in the process of analysis, then, it is easy to lose focus. It is 
not that the rhetoric of advertising is an uninteresting topic; it is simply not the 
topic of this project. This is why the research question is important as a guide to 
the analysis: in this case, the analysis is concerned with how the discipline is 
defined, and should be focused on answering that question, whatever else is 
going on, based on what is on the page.  
 
 
Structure and Presentation 
 
When presenting a final analysis, I suggest students follow the format of the 
above-mentioned article (Lamont, 2007), by providing three brief extracts as 
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exemplars of a particular theme, and then analyzing these in a way that ensures 
that each analytical point is supported by each of the three extracts, according to 
the following structure:  
 
Extract 1 
 
Extract 2 
 
Extract 3 
 
Analysis 
In these extracts, description x can be seen: example of x from extract 1; example 
of x from extract 2; example of x from extract 3. Description y can also be seen: 
example of y from extract 1; example of y from extract 2; example of y from 
extract 3. The function of these descriptions is z: example of z from extract 1; 
example of z from extract 2; example of z from extract 3. 
 
Unlike the analysis of the single extract above, this helps to direct the student to 
think about precisely what is common in the data. In practice, of course, there is 
more flexibility, and the final projects do not always reflect such a structure. 
However, by using such a structure as a guide, at least in the early stages, the 
extent to which the analysis is rooted in the data is made clear to both the 
student and supervisor. Here is an example of the structure being used in 
relation to the textbook distinctions between Psychology and common sense: 
 
Extract 1 
Sometimes, the results of scientific studies are denounced as ‘common sense’: 
that they are so obvious as to be not worth the bother of setting up the 
experiment. The view, however, is generally ill-informed because, as you will 
discover throughout this book, psychological research frequently contradicts 
common-sense views.  (Martin, 2009, 4-5) 
  
Extract 2 
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‘Every psychology teacher has to fight against the widespread view that 
psychology is mainly just common sense. First we should recognize that common 
sense has never been a very good guide to scientific truth (Raygor, 2005, 2). 
 
Extract 3 
‘Many people regard themselves as expert “people watchers” and form their own 
“common sense” theories of behaviour. However, you may be surprised to learn 
how many self-appointed authorities and common sense beliefs are wrong… 
Because of the limitations of common sense, psychologists have a special respect 
for scientific observation (Coon, 2004, 9-10). 
 
Analysis 
In these extracts, the texts distinguish between Psychology and common sense: it 
‘frequently contradicts common-sense views’ (extract 1); the ‘view that 
psychology is mainly just common sense’ is one that ‘[e]very psychology teacher 
has to fight against’ (extract 2); and psychologists recognize the ‘limitations of 
common sense’ (extract 3). In making the distinction, common sense is 
presented as flawed: it is ‘obvious’ (extract 1); it ‘has never been a very good 
guide to scientific truth’ (extract 2); it has ‘limitations’ and many ‘common sense 
beliefs are wrong’ (extract 3). By distinguishing Psychology from common sense 
in this way, the texts are able to align Psychology with science in its superiority 
to common sense: it ‘frequently contradicts common-sense views’, which 
‘scientific studies’ can be ‘denounced’ as (extract 1); it is not ‘just common sense’, 
which ‘has never been a very good guide to scientific truth’ (extract 2); and it is 
‘because of the limitations of common sense’ that ‘psychologists have a special 
respect for scientific observation’ (extract 3).  
 
 
Possible topics 
 
The definition of Psychology is, of course, an enormous theme that includes 
several related topics. For example, the scientific status of Psychology is itself a 
fundamental matter within CHIP. On the one hand, Psychology is invariably self-
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defined as scientific. On the other hand, as philosophers of science have shown, 
there is no essential boundary between science and non-science: such a 
boundary has to be constructed. How, then, do Psychologists construct the 
scientific status of their discipline? This is also a question that can be answered 
directly through discourse analysis of psychological texts (e.g. Lamont, 2010). 
Previous student projects have explored how psychologists have constructed 
their discipline as scientific by debunking rival psychological knowledge (such as 
phrenology, psychoanalysis or parapsychology) as pseudo-scientific. They have 
also explored how these unorthodox areas of psychological knowledge have 
sought to define themselves as scientific. 
 
The topic of scientificity can also be explored in relation to other conceptual and 
historical issues. Take for example, another key theme of CHIP: the role of 
history within Psychology. This typically involves making a distinction between 
‘old’ and ‘new’ histories of Psychology, in which the former are described as 
celebratory and presentist. This topic can be explored as a project, by examining 
how histories of Psychology construct a particular version of the discipline. 
Celebratory histories of Psychology, of course, invariably define Psychology as a 
science. This, then, provides an opportunity to explore how the history of 
psychology has been used to construct Psychology as a science. 
  
This was done in one student project, which for practical reasons also exploited 
the ubiquitous introductory textbook. After all, such textbooks typically include a 
brief history of the discipline that is an exemplar of celebratory presentism! 
Furthermore, these sections often serve as extended definitions of Psychology. 
However, they take a quite different form than the formal textbook definitions, in 
that they describe a particular version of the past as a means of constructing the 
scientific status of the present discipline. In this project, then, the research 
question was: How do textbook histories construct Psychology as scientific? 
 
Having collected the data from appropriate sections in textbooks, the 
preliminary analysis identified several common themes, such as the description 
of the birth of Psychology, and the description of Psychology as having a long 
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history but a short past. In analyzing these themes, more specific questions were 
asked of the data. For example, in the case of the birth of Psychology: how is this 
event constructed as such?; what went before?; what changed? Or, in the case of 
Psychology having a long history but a short past: what is the difference between 
these two things?; what has been going on for a long time?, what is more recent? 
Asking such questions of the data helps focus the analysis more narrowly, in 
order to see more clearly how the themes themselves are constructed.  
 
By then considering the function of such themes, in light of the main research 
question, it was seen how each contributed to a definition of the discipline as 
scientific. For example, Ebbinghaus’ famous remark that Psychology has a long 
past, but only a short history, was sometimes cited in order to construct a classic 
narrative of progress: 
 
‘Psychology has a long past, but only a short history’, wrote one of the first 
experimental psychologists, the German Hermann Ebbinghaus. By this he meant 
that scholars had long asked important questions about how people perceive 
reality, the nature of consciousness and the origins of madness – but they did not 
possess the means to answer them’ [Gerrig et al, 2012, 8} 
 
In this extract, the Ebbinghaus quote is explained (‘By this he meant’) in a way 
that constructs Psychology in a particular way. First, as in the extract above, it is 
presented as being concerned with the same questions that ‘scholars had long 
asked’. This, of course, is by no means a self-evident point, since the questions 
asked by scientific psychologists are far from identical to those asked by earlier 
scholars. Nevertheless, the particular questions cited here (‘about how people 
perceive reality, the nature of consciousness and the origins of madness’) are 
readable as ones that have long been, and continue to be, ‘important’. Second, 
Psychology is presented as providing the ‘means to answer’ these important 
questions, something that scholars previously ‘did not possess’. Thus, the 
contrast between ‘long history’ and ‘short past’ is used to construct Psychology 
as being concerned with the same longstanding important questions, but 
superior in its ability to answer them. 
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More common, however, was a similar pattern, but one that did not include 
Ebbinghaus’ remark. Here is another example of an analysis that employs the 
simple structure above, which is felt provides an analysis that better reflects the 
data. 
 
Extract 4 
although psychological issues had preoccupied the earliest thinkers as far back 
as the classical Greeks, psychology could not be considered a ‘science’ prior to 
the 19th century because no systematic attempt had been made to pursue or 
generate the testable hypotheses that were necessary for a field of interest to 
become a science. Philosophers had pontificated about the nature of the mind 
but psychology was not yet a science to measure it (Schacter et al, 2011, 3). 
 
Extract 5 
humans have long been intrigued by their own behavior, and attempts to 
understand human functioning can be traced to early Greek philosophers. But 
until the last quarter of the nineteenth century this endeavor was pursued 
through speculation, intuition and generalisations made on the basis of an 
individual’s experience. A major breakthrough occurred when the tools of 
science were applied to the study of humans, and psychology began to emerge as 
a distinct entity (Hewstone et al, 2005, 9). 
 
Extract 6 
In a sense, the history of psychology reaches back to ancient times when 
philosophers and religious leaders were asking questions about human nature 
and trying to explain human behavior … when those looking for answers turned 
from relying on their own intuition and their own experiences to carefully 
collecting information through systematic observation and controlled 
experiments, they transformed themselves from philosophers into scientists 
(Papalia & Wendkos Olds, 1988, 6-7) 
 
Analysis 
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The longstanding interest in such matters is stressed: they ‘had preoccupied the 
earliest thinkers as far back as the classical Greeks’ (extract 4); ‘can be traced to 
early Greek philosophers’ (extract 5); it ‘reaches back to ancient times’ (extract 
6). This continuity is constructed by providing an object of study that can be read 
as both of interest to the ancients and still of interest to psychologists: 
‘psychological issues’, ‘the nature of the mind’ (extract 4); ‘behaviour’, ‘human 
functioning’ (extract 5); ‘human nature’, ‘human behavior’ (extract 6). The claim 
that the ‘earliest thinkers’ were focusing on the same object as modern 
psychologists is, of course, far from self-evident. However, by constructing a 
continuous object of study, a comparison can be made in terms of how this has 
been studied. In making this comparison, prior attempts are presented as 
subjective: ‘Philosophers had pontificated about’ it (extract 4); it was ‘pursued 
through speculation, intuition and generalisations made on the basis of an 
individual’s experience’ (extract 5); they relied ‘on their own intuition and their 
own experiences’ (extract 6). In contrast, the emergence of scientific Psychology 
is presented as progress: from a ‘field of interest’ to a ‘science that could 
measure’ rather than ‘pontificate’ (extract 4); ‘a major breakthrough’ (extract 5); 
‘from relying on their own intuition … to carefully collecting information’ 
(extract 6). Thus, in a similar way that Ebbinghaus made a contrast between 
Psychology’s ‘long history’ and ‘short past’, these extracts construct a narrative 
of continuity in the object of study alongside one of progress in the method of 
enquiry. In doing so, they present Psychology as a scientific, and therefore 
superior, way of answering questions that have long troubled humanity. 
 
An alternative kind of topic is that of changing understandings of mental illness. 
Over the centuries, we have defined madness in radically different ways. Many 
different classification systems have been produced, based on different 
assumptions, and providing the basis for different treatments. The frequency and 
extent of change over time is, of course, not only a challenge to the idea that any 
given description is accurate, but also carries direct implications for how 
individuals are treated at any given time. The most obvious and relevant text in 
this respect is the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM), which has not only 
changed in significant ways with each new edition, but has also had to make the 
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case (in each of these editions) that this particular set of descriptions is a 
sufficient basis for diagnosis and treatment. Given the explicit sense of ongoing 
change that any edition of the DSM represents, not to mention the obvious 
context of potential criticism in which it is published, this poses an interesting 
discursive problem with practical implications: how do the authors justify the 
most recent changes? 
 
For example, the removal of homosexuality from the manual in 1973 followed 
well-publicized protests by gay rights activists, but was officially justified on the 
basis of scientific evidence (Bayer, 1987). Thus, one might examine how 
psychiatrists justified the change in scientific, rather than political, terms. On the 
other hand, discourse surrounding this, and many other, changes to the DSM 
have appeared in a wide range of media. The recent publication of DSM 5 was 
surrounded by controversy, online and in print. Discourse analysis of these texts 
could explore how particular understandings of madness are negotiated. 
 
Other possible topics include the analysis of introductions to psychological 
articles. These typically involve some kind of historical narrative, one that 
presents past research in a particular way in order to warrant the research that 
follows. Alternatively, there are countless articles, letters and interviews in 
journals such as The Psychologist, which discuss and dispute all manner of 
conceptual and historical issues in Psychology. By analyzing in detail how this is 
done, students can gain insight into the complexity of such topics, and are able to 
consider both sides of any given dispute. 
 
Such projects are excellent opportunities to encourage critical thinking. They 
demand a more critical reading of sources, and require that the student 
demonstrate the ability to construct a novel argument, to present that argument 
clearly, and to support it with evidence. Unlike more typical projects, however, 
which tend to be about teaching students how to do psychology, here students 
are required to think critically about the wider context in which psychological 
knowledge is produced, and the ways in which it is presented as authoritative. In 
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other words, it encourages the broader kind of critical thinking that makes CHIP 
so crucial to a psychological degree. 
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